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IV.

REPLIES

by Raoui Berger
A.

A Reply to ProfessorEllis

(1) Professor Ellis takes exception to my view that Congress was
designed to be the "senior partner" in government. He agrees, however,
that in the beginning there was a pervasive belief among Americans that
the legislative branch should predominate. 20 5 But he points to a progressive disenchantment with state legislatures in the 1776-1787 period, and
states that by 1789 the Founders were committed to a "strong and
independent" executive. Of course, I was fully aware of this development, the details of which were set forth in my 1969 book Congress v.
The Supreme Court. Ellis concedes that "this. . .does not 'prove' that
the Framers definitely intended the Executive branch to have the right
to deny legislative inquests whenever it pleases, but it certainly casts
doubt on Berger's claim that the Framers intended the legislative branch
to be the 'senior partner in the Government.' " Thus Ellis leaves the heart
of my thesis alone and singles out one of many cumulative details.
Even so, the vast disproportion between the battery of powers conferred on Congress-the power of the purse, 208 of war-making, 0 7 of
providing for the general welfare,20 8 etc.---contrasted with the few
skimpy powers conferred upon the President, 0 9 including the trivial
2 10
authority to request written opinions from members of his Cabinet,
alone testifies as to which branch was meant to be "senior." To be sure,
the President was intended to be "independent and strong," but within
the ambit of his enumerated and narrowly circumscribed powers. We
forget for example, that the sole textual grant of power to the President,
contained in three words--Commander-in-Chief2 1 was merely meant,
according to Hamilton, to make him "first General," and that "it
belongs to Congress only, to go to war."2 12 Although James Wilson was
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See BERrEa, CoNGREss, supra note 101, at 10-16.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 7,8,9.
Id. § 8, cis. 11, 12, 13 & 14.
Id. § 8, cl. 1.
Id. art. 1.
Id. § 2.
Id.
EXECuTIE PRrmmEGE, supra note 5, at 62-63, 69.
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the "leader of the 'strong executive' party, the "only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws and appointing officers."2 8 His view was shared by Roger Sherman 214 and others; it
was repeated in the Ratification Conventions, and much later reiterated
by Justice Holmes, Brandeis, Black,' Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson. 21. Wilson, in short, conceived the President chiefly as the agent for
executing the laws made by Congress.210 It was Madison, chief architect
of the Constitution, who stated that "[fin a republican government, the
legislative authority necessarily predominates ....,,217 How deep-rooted and continuing popular distrust of the Executive remained is illustrated by the fact that James Wilson still found it necessary in 1791 to
admonish the people that they' now elected the Executive and should
therefore discard the prejudices which they derived from royal appointments of governors.21 8 What better illustrates where the people put their
trust than the placement of the impeachment power in Congress-the
power of removing the President from office for the abuse of power or
betrayal of trust.
At no point did I argue that the President "should be subject to the
legislative control." Instead I showed that after he acted, he was accountable to Congress through the centuries-old power of "oversight"
exercised by the "Grand Inquest of the Nation." Accountability is
different from control; and today former high executive officersMcGeorge Bundy, Clark Clifford, Arthur Schlesinger and Theodore
Sorenson, among others, insist that accountability is the keystone of
democractic government. 19
Ellis is given to generalizations divorced from specific facts, but
generalizations, as Justice Holmes observed, do not settle concrete
cases. 220 Each particular problem must be examined against the context
of the particular facts, as I attempted to do in my studies of the war
213. Id. at 52, quoting CoRwiN, supranote 101, at 11 & 1 FARRAND, supra note 111, at
66.
214. Id. Roger Sherman "considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than
an instrument for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect." 1 FARRAND, supra note
111, at 65 quoted in ExcuTmvE PRImEGE, supra note 2, at 52.
215. EXEcuTivE PRiVmEGE, supra note 2, at 52-3, 59.

216. Id. at 53.
217. Id. at 50, quoting THE FEDERALIsT No. 51, supra note 26, at 338.

218. Id. at 49 n.2.
219. See, e.g.,

A. SCHLESINGER,

THE IMPERuIL PREsiDENcy

passim (1973);

T.

SORENSON, WATCHMEN IN THE NIGHT: PRESIDENTIAL ACCOuNTAEILITY AFTER WATERGATE

passim (1975).
220. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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powers, the power of legislative investigation and the foreign relations
power. With respect to those powers, I submit, there is precious little
"historical difficult[y] involved in determining with accuracy and clarity the Framers' original intent."221 For Ellis' assertions that I have
"determined the original intention of the Framers for more things than
. . . the evidence will allow," and that I am "forced to find clarity and
meaning in the Constitution where none really exists," he offers fragments drawn from Attorney General William Rogers' memorandum of
which he himself says that Berger "devastates both the logic and history" thereof. Nevertheless he selects two fragments for resuscitation.
Ellis first charges that my "interpretation of the meaning of the
Treasury Act of 1789 is open to serious question." That Act provides
that it shall be "the duty [of the Secretary of the Treasury] to . . . give
information [to Congress upon request] . . . respecting all matters

. . . which shall appertain to his office ...
." One who contradicts the
plain meaning of statutory terms must adduce convincing evidence that
the intention of the draftsmen was quite different from what they said in
the statute. What does Ellis produce? "The intent of that piece of
legislation . . . was to make the head of the Treasury Department a

more important officer than the other cabinet members who were not
requiredto report to Congress, and to allow the executive department to
influence congressional proceedings in economic and financial matters."
It may be doubted whether a cabinet member who "is not required to
report to Congress" would consider himself less "important"; he would
likely feel himself privileged. But in truth Ellis garbles the history that
was spread out in my book. Hamilton had drafted a statute that would
222
permit him to come to Congress at his pleasure to advise Congress,
and thereby had aroused resentment in the House at the "intrusion." In
consequence that Act was whittled down to impose a duty to report
upon request, which merely articulated the familiar parliamentary practice. No similar statute was drawn with respect to the other departments
because they attempted no similar "intrusion," and because the statute
was merely declaratory of the historical power of "oversight." 223 For this
221. In regard to the war powers, my views are shared, to name only the most recent
publications, by L. HENmN, FOREIGN AFFAIRs AND THE CoNsTrTUnON (1972); Lofgren,
War Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE LJ. 672
(1972); Reveley, ConstitutionalAllocation of the War Powers Between the President
and Congress, 15 VA. J. IN'L LAW 73 (1974). The basis of my war powers chapter was
published in a law review in 1972. See Warmaking, supranote 124.
222. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65 (now 31 U.S.C. § 1002 (1970)). See
Exncurrw PsivuEGn, supra note 5, at 38-9.
223. See ExEcUTr

PRmVILEGE, supra note 5, at 198-200.
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we have the weighty testimony of Attorney General Caleb Cushing in
1854:

By express provision of law, it is made the duty of the Secretary of
the Treasury to communicate information to either House of Congress
when desired; and it is practically and by legal implication the same
with the other Secretaries .... 224
It is this history that Ellis sums up by saying the Act of 1787 "was
symbolic of the expansion of executive influence and power and not of
legislative supremacy . .

."!

Next Ellis invokes Washington's refusal of the Jay Treaty papers to
the House, although he had given them to the Senate, and cites Madison's statement that the President had discretion to withhold information. Berger, says Ellis, "dismisses its significance because the House of
Representatives did not formally endorse Madison's point of view." In
actual fact it did more, it plainly repudiated that view and insisted
throughout upon delivery of papers.22 5 Madison well knew that the
construction of the Constitution was fixed by the House, not by Madison
standing in opposition thereto. 2 6 John Adams, then Vice-President, was
in complete sympathy with the House. 227 Moreover, after Hamilton had
suggested to Washington that he should invoke his "discretion" to
withhold,228 Washington chose rather to challenge the jurisdiction of the
House to inquire because it was not a partner in the treaty-making
process.929 The inference that he had no stomach for invocation of
"discretion" to withhold is confirmed by the statement in his refusal of
the papers that he had no disposition "to withold any information...
which could be required of him by either House as a right, ' 23 0 as his
turnover of the papers to the Senate attests. A scholar who would
impeach the judgment of another needs more solid grounds than Ellis
has mustered.
Special significance is attached by Ellis to the alleged fact that "the
House was not able to force Washington to lay before it the papers
demanded. . .

."

In truth, the matter never came to a head; no subpoe-

na was issued, no articles of impeachment were filed. Despite the
224. Id. at 200, quoting 6 Op. ATr'y GEN. 326, 333 (1856).
225. Id. at 174-78.
226. Id. at 177 n.89.

227. Id. at 173. For similar sentiments of Jefferson, see id. at 176 n.81.
228. Berger, Executive Privilege: A Reply to Professor Sofaer, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
603, 608 (1975).
229. ExEctmvE P~ivILnEG, supra note 5, at 172.
230. Id., quoting 5 ANNALs, supra note 118, at 76-62.
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omission of Congress over the years to take such steps towards enforcement of its demands, it is generally acknowledged that Congress has
power to demand information from the President, as Attorney General
Cushing said in 1956.
(2) The second point made by Ellis is that "a preoccupation with the
Framers' 'original intention' . . . would surely become a rigid, narrow,

absolutistic and backward looking device that could verge on a form of
ancestor worship." Now Ellis agrees that the attitude "that the Constitution can be so loosely interpreted as to mean anything they want it to
mean has dangerous implications," and that "there are dangers in the
continued arrogation of power by the executive department." Since fear
of a "rigid" Constitution is hypothetical, whereas interpretive license has
proven real, I would choose the lesser of the two evils. The war-making
power, for example, but for the "conduct" of war by the "first General,"
was plainly conferred upon Congress. Can we condone the reallocation
by the President of those powers to himself on the theory that otherwise
we will arrive at "ancestor worship?" The excess of Mr. Nixon in still
other constitutional areas cries out against such philosophizing. The basic
premise of our "limited" federal government is that its officers must stay
within limits; in the words of Jefferson, we should "bind . . . down

from mischief by the chains of the Constitution those whom we entrust
with power."2" 1 Ellis would convert those chains to ropes of sand. It is

for that reason, that I stress that where the "original intention" is clear,
it must be given effect. If the "sense in which the Constitution was
accepted and ratified by the Nation.

.

.be not the guide in expounding

it," said Madison, "there can be no security for a consistent and stable
government, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers. 2 32 For the
abiding value of Madison's counsel we need look no further than
Richard Nixon.
But, says Ellis, the amendment process is "impracticable," it is "extremely difficult to correct mistakes when they are made." To my mind
this affords added reason for giving no constitutional footing to such
"mistakes." Because the process of amendment is "difficult," it does not
follow that the agents of the people may change the Constitution without consulting them. An agent, said Hamilton "cannot new-model his
231. WARREN,supranote 50, at 148.
232. ExEcuTrivE PRIVmEGE, supra note 5, at 97, quoting 9 J. MADISON, WRITINGS 191,
372 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910).
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own cormmission. ' '233 Let it be admitted that the "amending process
enormously increases the power of minority and special interest groups
to block change." But they were empowered to do so by the Constitution
itself, and apart from reading article V out of the Constitution, I prefer
the judgment of one-quarter of the States, where the Founders placed it,
than to turn it over to a self-appointed elite. If in truth "the changed
conditions of the twentieth century have in many ways made outdated
eighteenth century ideas about how power should be distributed and
controlled," let the change be made by the people as the Constitution
requires, not by future Nixons or closet philosophers. As Myers McDougal stated: "Government by a self-designated elite-like that of benevolent despotism or Plato's philosopher kings-may be a good form
of government for some peoples, but it is not the American way. 23 4
B.

A Reply to ProfessorBenedict

(1) Professor Benedict labels my book "lawyers' history," but adds
that he does "not mean that in a pejorative sense." It has no other. The
coiners of the phrase, Professors Alfred Kelly and Paul Murphy, used it
to describe the selection, creation and suppression of historical facts by
judges and lawyers to rationalize a preconceived result; 235 what Benedict calls "history designed to give direct guidance to present-day decision makers." That label fits no work of mine. My studies of executive
privilege were first publishd in 1965, 2 when I was an academician;
and my High Crimes and Misdemeanors23 7 was in the hands of the
editors in the summer of 1970, long before there was an "impeach
Nixon" cloud on the horizon. No "decisions" were impending that called
for a lawyers "guidance." All of my scholarly publications, reaching
back to 1935,238 had their source in unalloyed intellectual curiosity:
"how and why," to use Benedict's words, did this or that doctrine arise.
To make his point, Benedict says of my Executive Privilege that it
"stakes out a position and sustains it . . .it is legal advocacy." That is
233. Id. at 94, quoting Letters of Camillus, 6 A. HAMILTON, WoRKS, 166 (H. Lodge
ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as Camillus].
234. Id. at 345 n.15, quoting McDougal & Lans, supra note 79, at 577-78.
235. Kelly, Clio and the Courts: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119;
Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional History,
69 Am. HIsT. REv. 64 (1963).
236. CongressionalInquiry, supra note 124.
237. IMPEACHMENT, supra note 124.
238. See Berger, Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Nuisance, 29 ILL. L. REV.
372 (1934); Berger, Usury in Installment Sales, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PaoB. 148 (1935).
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no more "advocacy," or unscholarly, than those who sustained the
position that phlogiston gave an inadequate explanation of combustion.
But Benedict is hardly the man to venture such criticism. He carried on
his extended apprenticeship under the wing of a leading Revisionist of
the Reconstruction era. The Revisionists, remarks Professor Alfred Kelly, a sympathizer, have "quietly junked" the "historiography of the
1930's," "mainly by altering the premises on which [their] analysis
' Now one who "alters premises" starts with a preconception.24 °
rests. 239
Benedict himself published a Revisionist version of the impeachment of
Andrew Johnson, in which Johnson is painted in unrelieved black, the
Lucifer of Reconstruction who should have been hung from the nearest
tree. 241 A comparison of this study with the balanced Revisionist studies
of Eric McKitrick 242 and W.R. Brock 2" will give the reader a taste of
Benedict's "objectivity." I too published a study of the Johnson impeachment, but I belong to no school; I approached the Johnson impeachment and Reconstruction without any preconceptions whatsoever,
without seeking to prove anything, merely soaking myself in the record
of the trial and drawing my conclusions therefrom. So I may fairly claim
that my study of the Johnson impeachment, which affords a basis of
comparison, yields nothing to Benedict's "objectivity"; if anything, it
was Benedict, not I, who tailored his study to his "staked out position."
(2) To a constitutional historian, be his approach that of American
history or legal history, the starting point with respect to a question of
constitutional power must be the Constitution. Since there are no express constitutional provisions that bear on executive privilege, inquiry
had to begin with the English practice on which our institutions are
modeled. So the Supreme Court held on the very issue of Congressional
inquiry. 244 In tracing the English parliamentary development and how
that practice was adopted by the Framers, I pursued the "how" path
Benedict recommends. The "why," I found, was a profound distrust of
239. Kelly, Comment, in NEw FROmmRS: THE AMIMUCAN RECONSTRUCTION 40, 41
(1966).
240. For such Revisionists, writes Kelly,
Southern rupture of the Union becomes a deliberate attempt to preserve a way of
life at once obsolete and morally evil, so that the Republican refusal to conciliate
the South on slavery and secession becomes patriotic and enlightened public policy
rather than something corrupt, stupid or benighted.
Id. at 41. What is this but to "stake out a position" which determines all that follows.
241. See BENEDIcr, supra note 148.
242. E. MCKrRICuK, ANDRlw JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCION (1960).
243. W. BROCK, AN AICAm N Crsis: CoNGREss AND RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1867

(1963).
244. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1928).
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executive power shared by the English and the Founders. My study of
parliamentary records persuaded me that the legislative power of inquiry
was untrammeled, that there were no executive claims of right to
withhold information from Parliament and that, as the historical evidence shows, the Founders intended to endow Congress with the powers
of the "Grand Inquest of the Nation" despite the separation of powers.
Having established the inquisitorial power of the Grand Inquest,
having found no pre-1789 historical warrant for executive claims of a
right to deny information to Congress, I turned to what Benedict himself
labels a "rote catalog of past instances of withholding" by a number of
presidents. Are these what he refers to when he states that there "are
strong historical arguments on the other side?" If so, I would remind
him, in the words of Lord Chief Justice Denman, that: "The practice of
a ruling power in the state is but a feeble proof of its legality. 2 45 My
critique of these "precedents" is regarded as "devastating" by Professor
Archibald Cox,246 Victor Rosenblum,147 A.L. Sofaer 248 and Garry
Wills. 249 Assume that those "precedents" retain some credibility, can a
President or a succession of presidents revise the Constitution singlehandedly? That was what Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon attempted with respect to the war powers; and eminent historians
are in agreement that such a reallocation of the powers granted to
Congress is unconstitutional. As Hamilton said, "an agent cannot newmodel his own commission. ' 250 Nor can a democracy tolerate presidential revision of the Constitution. Benedict is, therefore, in error when he
asserts that I set out to find "whether there is a legal precedent." Instead
I turned to English and American constitutional history to trace a source
of power. It is he, not I, who devotes the bulk of his discussion to the
post-1792 "precedents." What Parliament and the Founders said and
did are no less historical "facts" for being viewed by a lawyer.
Benedict points up his distinction between an historian's and a lawyer's approach by reference to a number of these "precedents," remarking that for an historian these incidents "demonstrate how even the early
Presidents began to create constitutional doctrine," whereas I discount
them. I did more; I demonstrated that presidential bootstrapping cannot
245. Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 E.R. 1112, 1171 (Q.B. 1839).
246. Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1383 (1974) [hereinafter cited as

Cox].
247.
248.
249.
250.

Rosenblum, Book Review, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 653 (1974).
Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HARv. L REv. 281 (1974).
Wills, Book Review, N.Y. Times at 1 (May 5, 1974).
Camillus, supra note 233, at 166.
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create constitutionalpower notwithstanding their desire to create "constitutional doctrine." Apparently Benedict himself has no respect for
mere "rote cataloguing" of such incidents. Does an historian engage in
advocacy when he subjects such incidents to critical analysis, particularly when the Executive seeks to convert them into "constitutional doctrine?" It is not, therefore, enough to say, as does Benedict, that by
1880 there were two sets of precedents, that "each side could cite...
constitutional texts." In fact, there were no constitutional texts. The task
of the scholar is to sift the "two sets" and to decide which represents
constitutional design. One must learn to distinguish between "precedenf' and psuedo-precedent.
Benedict reproaches me for not attending more carefully to the
political conflicts out of which these "precedents" arose; but in my view
they had no bearing on the issue whether power was conferred on the
Executive by the Constitution to withhold information. These conflicts
neither added to nor detracted from what powers were granted by the
Constitution, the subject of my study. Shifting political interests that
influence given presidents to withhold information cannot affect the
provisions of the Constitution, explicit or implicit. Benedict stresses that
"Washington's decision to withhold from the House of Representatives
his instructions to the Jay Treaty negotiators was part of the bitter
conflict between his Federalists and the newly organizing Republicans
over a broad range of issues of which foreign policy was the most
important." That sheds no light on the question: what power to withhold did he have under the Constitution? Far more important is the
ground Washington assigned for withholding from the House papers he
had delivered to the Senate-not a claim of "discretion!' to withhold but
that the House had no "right" to the papers because it was not a partner
in treaty making. In discussing such cases, parenthetically, Benedict
needs to bear in mind that it is not given to the President to determine
the limits of Congress' power; that task is reserved to the courts. In sum,
the reason Washington assigned for withholding is also an historical fact
and it illuminates the scope of the "constitutional doctrine" that Washington allegedly "began to create." A lawyer is not the less an historian
because he considers one fact more important than another, for historians differ among themselves as to what are the relevant facts, as the
Revisionist version of Reconstruction which "junks" that of predecessor
historians, abundantly testifies.
A word prompted by Benedict's reference to the Grant and Cleveland
claims that Congress can inquire only where it can legislate; and that
where the President has independent power inquiry is barred. They
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overlook the historic legislative power of "oversight," of inquiry into
legislative conduct, a rubric of parliamentary inquiry recognized by
Montesquieu, 251 by Justice Holmes, 252 and by the Supreme Court's reference in Watkins v. United States258 to Congress' power to inquire into
executive "corruption and inefficiency ....,25" In a democracy it is
perilous to hold that a President is unaccountable in any area of executive power, as Watergate taught afresh.
Finally, Benedict states that presidents rested on their oath to defend
the Constitution and on their obligation to execute the laws, as if that
gives the "precedents" constitutional footing. Can it be that one charged
with execution of the laws may keep secret from the lawmakers how
they are being executed? Certainly this was not the view of Parliament,
nor of Montesquieu, the apostle of the separation of powers. So too, the
"obligation to defend the Constitution" begs the question: what does the
Constitution contemplate--executive secrecy or executive accountability? Was Richard Nixon justified in relying on his "oath" and "obligation" to withhold information from Congress and the Courts? These,
I submit, are not merely proper but crucial questions for historians.
My demonstration that the "Legislative Power" embraced unfettered
legislative inquiry into executive conduct and was in the contemplation
of the Founders has generally been ignored or slighted by the academicians. Does my evidence stand up; are my inferences justifiable? That, I
suggest, is what calls for further study and not the discredited presidential "precedents" which Professor Cox newly dismissed, 5 and which
Benedict and Ellis would rehabilitate. If Benedict draws "little comfort" from seeking "to extract a general principle of constitutional law
from historical precedent" it is because he has focussed on the psuedoprecedents to the neglect of parliamentary history and its reception by
the Founders.

251. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 56, at 187, quoted in ExEcuTIVE PIuVILEGE, supra
note 5, at 3-4.
252. J. HURST, JusncE HOLMES ON LEGAL HSTORY 98 (1964). See also EXECuTIv.
PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 4 n. 14.

253. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). See also ExEcuTrE PRrVILEGE, supra note 5, at 42 n.159.
254. 354 U.S. at 187.
255. Cox, supra note 246, passim.

